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MIRANDA v. ARIZONA:
IN- CUSTODY INTERROGATION: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE NEW RULES FURTHER DEFINING THE
SUSPECT'S RIGHTS
In Miranda v. Arizona1 the Supreme Court recently held that
the fifth amendment prohibits the prosecution's use of inculpatory
or exculpatory statements resulting from police interrogation conducted without procedural safeguards designed to protect the individual's privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, the
Court laid down the following rules which are to apply when a
person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation: The suspect
must be warned in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the
right to remain silent. Such a warning is a prerequisite in overcoming the pressures inherent in the atmosphere of interrogation.
It is designed to eliminate any fears the suspect might have that the
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that
his silence, in the face of an accusation, will weigh against him when
interpreted by a jury.
The person in custody must also be warned that anything he
says can and will be used against him in court. This warning makes
him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences
of waiving it. In addition, it emphasizes that the persons with
whom he is dealing are not acting solely in his best interests.
Before interrogation, the suspect must be informed that he has
the right to consult with counsel and have counsel with him during
questioning. The right to have counsel present at the interrogation
is necessary to protect his fifth amendment privilege, as the will of
a suspect, merely warned by his interrogators of his right to remain
silent can be subsequently overcome by the subtle pressures inherent in in-custody interrogation. The circumstances surrounding
interrogation can overbear even the will of a suspect who has been
preliminarily advised by his own attorney.2 Failure to request
counsel does not constitute a waiver. The right to counsel during
interrogation cannot be waived until after the foregoing warnings
have been given.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), wherein the suspect
made incriminating statements after seeing his lawyer gesture to him
through an open doorway, which gesture the defendant testified he interpreted as meaning he was not to say anything. In this case, defendant's
request to consult with his attorney had been denied by the police officers.
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The person in custody must further be advised that if he is
indigent and desires an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him. This is to make it clear to the suspect that his right to
counsel is not limited by his lack of funds.
These warnings must be given regardless of the suspect's age,
education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities. The court
will not consider whether a particular defendant was aware of his
rights, as any assessment of his knowledge based on the above factors can be only speculation. 3
The Court noted that Congress and the States are free to develop other procedures for safeguarding the fifth amendment privilege and that the guidelines of Miranda are not intended to impose
a "constitutional straitjacket" upon law enforcement officers. Any
procedures devised by Congress and the States, however, must be
at least as effective in protecting the privilege as the safeguards set
forth in Miranda.
If before or during questioning the suspect indicates in any
manner that he wishes to remain silent, the questioning must cease.
If he states that he desires counsel, there can be no interrogation
until an attorney is present. To forego these rights, there must be
a waiver made "voluntarily knowingly and intelligently," and any
evidence that the waiver was obtained by threats, tricks, or cajolings will negate its effect. A heavy burden of proof that any
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination or of the right to
retained or appointed counsel was knowingly and intelligently
made is borne by the state.
The Court pointed out that its holding in Miranda does not
affect statements freely and voluntarily made, without compelling
influences. Such statements, although given without benefit of'
counsel, continue to be admissible in evidence. The import of the
fifth amendment privilege is not violated when an individual speaks
to police without benefit of warnings and counsel, but is violated
when he is interrogated without those warnings. Police are still
free to accept confessions or volunteered statements of any kind
made by persons who call or enter a police station stating that they
wish to confess to a crime, as such statements are delivered without
the influence of the interrogation process.
The Court arrived at these constitutionally required principles
without specific concentration on the facts of Miranda or the three
other cases decided in the same opinion. 4 The confessions in those
3. Cf. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). See also Cicenia
v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1954), which, together with Crooker, was overruled
by Miranda.

4. Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, California v.
Stewart.
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cases were produced, however, under circumstances which are exemplary of the type of coercion which the Court seeks to prevent.
In each case the confession admitted at trial had been delivered by
the defendant after being held incommunicado and interrogated
in police custody. The interrogations ranged in length from two
hours to five days. Although there was proof that some warning
had been given to defendants Miranda and Westover, it was ineffectual because it did not come at the beginning of the interrogation. Likewise, statements incorporated into the written confessions that the defendant was aware of his rights were held to be
insufficient proof that the requisite warnings had been made at
the proper time. Even an appropriate interrogation procedure
by the FBI was disapproved by the Court because it immediately
followed a police questioning which failed to meet the constitutional standards.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the five member majority, reflects the Court's concern with confessions obtained during
in-custody interrogation. The very nature of such incommunicado
interrogations prevents the public and the courts from learning
what transpires in the interrogation rooms. Such secrecy serves to
free police officers to use whatever methods they deem necessary in
order to elicit confessions. Although the Court recognizes that
physical brutality and third degree methods are not nearly as
prevalent as they had been,5 it points out that physical force and
prolonged questioning incommunicado are sufficiently widespread
to be of concern. 6 Third degree methods are not only in violation of
the law, but they also increase the possibility of false confessions
and tend to make police lazy in investigating crimes.
The Court observed that coercion can be mental as well as
physical. Some extremely sophisticated methods of interrogating
suspects and discouraging them from consulting with counsel or
family, are recommended by police manuals and texts on interrogation procedures. 7 Even without brutality, third degree meth5. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Vernor v. Alabama,. 313 U.S. 547 (1941); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1958); People v. Wakat,
415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); Bruner v. People, 113 Col. 194, 156 P.2d
111 (1945).
6. See People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d
931 (1965); People v. Matlock, 51 Cal.2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959); Kier v.
State, 213 Md. 556, 132 A.2d 494 (1957).
7. See, e.g., INBAU AND REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONrESSIONS (1962) and O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIcATION (1959).
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ods or the psychological tactics suggested by the police manuals,
the very atmosphere of in-custody interrogation serves as a tool
in the hands of police in questioning suspects. When held incommunicado in an unfamiliar atmosphere dominated by police, suspects have repeatedly failed to exercise their constitutional rights. 8
The Court noted that, although the confessions in each of the cases
presented in the Miranda appeal were obtained without physical
force or psychological stratagems, each of the suspects was thrust
into a police-dominated atmosphere and subjected to interrogation
procedures designed to weaken his will to resist questioning.
The Court, specifically recognizing that the confessions in the
instant cases might not be involuntary in traditional terms, extended the concept of voluntariness:
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at
odds with . . . [the fifth amendment privilege].

Unless

adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choiceY
The Court concluded that the fifth amendment privilege is applicable during in-custody interrogation:
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to
the techniques of persuasion described [in the police manuals] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in
the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial
observers to guard against intim10
idation or trickery.
The presence of counsel would protect the fifth amendment privilege by insuring that statements made in the police dominated atmosphere of in-custody interrogation are not the product of compulsion. The Court pointed out that without the protection afforded by warnings of right to silence and right to counsel "all the
careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony ...
would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have
already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."'1
8.
372 U.S.
9.
10.
11.

Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
528 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
384 U.S. at 457-58.
384 U.S. at 461.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
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The dissenting justices expressed the opinion that the new
rules are not sustained by fifth amendment precedents but rather
were derived by analogy from sixth amendment precedents which
are not applicable to police interrogation. 12 The majority's "right
to counsel to protect the fifth amendment privilege" was viewed as a
limited fifth amendment right to counsel, which has no basis in the
fifth amendment.13 It was felt that the voluntariness of confessions should be continued to be determined by the "totality of cir14
cumstances" test.
Justice Harlan expressed the opinion that the rules were designed not to guard against police brutality or coercion but to discourage confessions entirely. 15 He pointed out that the new rules
induce the suspect to obtain counsel before the questioning may
proceed. Once the lawyer sees the suspect, he may well become an
obstacle to truth finding. 6 It was predicted that the rules would
decrease, if not eliminate confessions, thus impairing a useful instrument of law enforcement. 17 As some crimes cannot be solved
without confessions, the new rules will permit some criminals to go
free.' 8 The dissenting opinions expressed the belief that the Court
is taking a real risk with society's welfare, and that the decision
entails harmful consequences for the country at large. 19
Justice White suggested that the Court has unfairly tipped the
balance against society. 20 He pointed out that corroborated confessions are highly reliable, 21 while Justice Clark stated that police
brutality is rare. 22 Moreover, noted Justice Harlan, the rules do
not prevent coercion, as the police officer who would lie about his
23
methods of interrogation is still free to do so.
DiscussioN
Miranda is another in a series of recent decisions interpreting
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
sixth amendment's right to counsel. Both these provisions of the
12. 384 U.S. at 505, 510, 512, 513-14, 526.

13. Id. at 537.
14. Id. at 502-03, 534.
15.
16.

Id. at 505.
Id. at 514, 521.

See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949)

(sep-

arate opinion): "[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."
17. 384 U.S. at 509, 516.
18. Id. at 517, 542.
19. Id. at 504, 517.
20.

Id. at 537.

21. Id. at 538
22.

Id. at 499-500.

23. Id. at 505, 516.
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Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
24

amendment.

25
When Miranda is compared with Massiah v. United States

and Escobedo v. Illinois, 2 6 the Court's step by step broadening of

these rights becomes apparent. In Massiah, police obtained incriminating statements from a defendant through the use of a
radio transmitter installed in the car of a co-operative co-defendant. The Court held that the statements, which had been elicited
after the defendant had been indicted and in the absence of counsel,
were not admissible, as the sixth amendment applies to indirect as
well as direct interrogations. In Escobedo, the statements which
were later held to be inadmissible were taken in the police station
prior to indictment. The police had not warned the defendant of
his right to remain silent and had denied his request to consult
with his retained 27 attorney, who was in the police station asking to
see his client. Relying heavily on Massiah, the Court held that the
right to counsel attaches when "the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect ....
The fact that the suspect had not been
indicted before the interrogation took place made no difference in
the outcome.
Miranda examines the right to counsel not in the context of the
sixth amendment but rather as a right to counsel to protect the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 29 Nevertheless, it follows, in logical progression, the sixth amendment
principles set forth in Massiah and Escobedo. Both of these cases
involve the fifth amendment privilege, since the purpose of police
interrogation is to elicit incriminating statements from the suspect.3 0 Moreover, Mr. Justice Goldberg, in delivering the majority
opinion in Escobedo, foreshadowed Miranda's definition of a right
to counsel to protect the fifth amendment privilege when he spoke
of the constitutional "right of the accused to be advised by his
lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination." 31
"21

24. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment).
25. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
26. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
27. The distinction between retained and appointed counsel should
not be relevant. Gideon seems to indicate that there is a right to appointed
counsel whenever there is a right to retained counsel. See Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,73
YALE L. J. 1000, 1007 (1964).
This reasoning is, of course, strengthened by
Miranda.
28. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
29. 384 U.S. at 444, 466.
30. Note, 78 HARv. L. REV. 143, 219 (1964).

31. 378 U.S. at 488. See also Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion
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The guidelines set down in Miranda apply to statements obtained during "custodial interrogation." This term is defined in
the opinion as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."' 2 This certainly
would seem to place the right to counsel earlier in the investigatorial process than did Escobedo's "focus" terminology, despite the
statement in Miranda that the definition of "custodial interrogation" is what the Court meant in Escobedo when it spoke of an investigation which had focused on the accused.33 This statement is
a bit difficult to accept, in view of Escobedo's plain inference that
questioning which is part of a general investigation of an unsolved
crime, prior to any "focus" of guilt on a particular individual, may
be conducted without the assistance of counsel. Under Miranda,
even the questioning of witnesses, if they are deprived of their
freedom of action sufficiently to constitute custodial interrogation,
must be conducted with the safeguards the Court laid down. The
Court presents Miranda not as an extension of Escobedo but as a
clarification thereof. This appears to be an attempt to soften the
impact of Miranda. Miranda, however, should not be construed
as creating any new rights. The case merely provides that the
authorities go further in advising a suspect of his fully acknowledged constitutional rights than has heretofore been required.
Depending on whether it is an extension or a clarification of
Escobedo, Miranda renders moot or answers the question of precisely when an investigation ceases to be a general investigation of
an unsolved crime and begins to "focus" on the accused. Miranda's guidelines will certainly apply to any questioning which takes
place in the police station. How far "custodial interrogation" can
extend outside the confines of the station-house is one of the great
uncertainties of the case. By its own pronouncement the Court
would apply the rules any time "after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. '3 4 The uncertainty may be illustrated in a hypoin Escobedo, wherein he apprehended Miranda:
At the very least the Court holds that once the accused becomes
a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any admission made to the
police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused
has waived his right to counsel ....
It is incongruous to assume
that the provision for counsel in the Sixth Amendment was meant
to amend or supersede the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
Amendment....
378 U.S. at 495, 497.
32. 384 U.S. at 444.
33. Id. at 444, n. 4.
34. 384 U.S. at 444.
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thetical: Police, upon arriving at the scene of a murder in an
apartment house, order all residents to remain in their apartments.
The police then question the occupants in the privacy of each unit
for details of the crime, but without the necessary warnings. Does
this procedure significantly deprive those persons of their freedom
of action; or does it rather fall under the Court's observation that
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime
or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process
is not affected by our holding." 5
The question may be raised also as to street corner interrogation either before or after arrest. The language of the opinion suggests that the crucial question is not whether the questioning is
general questioning of witnesses or of suspects. This would resurrect the Escobedo "focus" rationale. Rather, the applicability of the
rules will be governed by the degree to which the defendant was
deprived of his freedom of action at the time he made the statements in question. Situations could be postulated in which a suspect's questioning would be subject to all the inherent coercion of
station-house interrogation, though conducted on the street or in his
own room. Presumably the courts must be guided by the standard of inherent coercion under the facts and cannot impose immutable boundaries on the concept of "custody." If Miranda
were to be limited strictly to the station-house interrogations the
ambiguity could be avoided. The Court has felt, apparently, that
such a limitation would be an invitation to circumvention.
The argument most frequently raised against Miranda is that
the decision will hamper the enforcement of the criminal law and
thus impose on society an increased risk of recidivism. The unconvicted offender is free to violate the law again. Assertions on
both sides of this argument are made with considerable fervor.
Although subject to much speculation, Miranda's effect on the
number of criminal convictions cannot be measured. The available
statistics do not indicate how many guilty pleas have been obtained
because the police held a confession taken under circumstances
which would now make that confession inadmissible. Likewise, it
is not known how many successful prosecutions have been based on
confessions inadmissible under Miranda, or whether in each case
the evidence presented, without the confession, would have supported the conviction. These statistical uncertainties inhibit objective evaluation of Miranda's impact on law enforcement. Obviously, confessions will not be used with as great facility as heretofore. The increased burden on law enforcement would necessarily
seem to follow. The ability of the police to operate effectively under
35.

384 U.S. at 477.
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the new rules will determine whether the threatened risk does
materialize.
Another argument which might be propounded against the rules
laid down in Miranda is based on the theory of the two stage criminal process. It is said that the criminal process is composed of an
informal, fact-finding stage and a formal, accusatorial stage. The
contention is that the provisions of the Bill of Rights regarding
criminal procedures were intended to apply only to the formal
stage e
It is conceded that the two stage criminal process did exist
during the eighteenth century. At that time there were no police.
Criminal investigation was an informal, private process. Factfinding was a private function conducted by individual citizens
who could prosecute a criminal if they were injured by his crime.
Interrogation took place only when the accused was willing. The
initial confrontation between the accused and the amassed adversary powers of the state took place at the trial. Gradually the function of the police increased beyond merely guarding against crime
and arresting known offenders and came to include criminal investigation. As the investigation of crime became a public function, police interrogation was developed. With the investigative
processes now in the hands of the state, the point of critical confrontation between the accused and the amassed power of the state
shifted from the trial to the police interrogation. The police process
is the point at which the state now enters. The standards of the
Bill of Rights must be applied at the critical point in the police
process regardless of where it moves.3 7 The Miranda court recognized this when it stated that "It is at this point [police interrogation] that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences. . .. ,,3" When Massiah's denial of counsel after indictment
rationale and Escobedo's determination of the critical stage as being
the point at which guilt has begun to focus on the accused are examined in the light of the foregoing, it becomes apparent that the
provisions of the Bill of Rights must be available immediately
upon the suspect's being subjected to interrogation while in custody.

"Anything less

. . .

might deny a defendant 'effective repre-

sentation by counsel at the only stage where legal aid and advice
would help him.' 39

Miranda answers other questions raised by Escobedo. The
guidelines which the Court spells out answer the question of what
36. Note, 73 YALe L. J. 1000, 1017 (1964).
37. Id.at 1034-51.
38. 384 U.S. at 477.
39. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964), quoting Douglas,
J., concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959).
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is an effective warning. Miranda also eliminates any question of
necessity of a request for counsel. This was not certain after
Escobedo.40 If the right to counsel depended on a request, this
would discriminate against the ignorant and the inexperienced, who
are not aware of their constitutional rights. Similarly the privilege
against self-incrimination should not depend upon the suspect's
41
awareness of it.

The Court's prohibition applies equally to exculpatory and
inculpatory statements. Obviously if a statement were truly exculpatory it would be of no value to the prosecution. Statements
intended by the accused to be exculpatory are often used to impeach his testimony at trial. Many times they show guilt by implication.4 2 Such was the case with Escobedo's exclamation, "I
' 43
didn't shoot Manuel, you did it."

Miranda raises other questions. One of these is the applicability of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 44 Should physical evidence to which the police were led by an inadmissible confession also be excluded at trial? The Court was not required to
rule on this specific issue. Mr. Justice Clark, in his dissenting
opinion, states that the majority holds the doctrine applicable. 45
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine certainly should apply.
Without such a rule, the police would be encouraged to interrogate
without the warnings in order to discover non-confessional evidence of guilt. Miranda undoubtedly was not intended to encourage evasion of the very rules it laid down.
As the states are free to establish their own procedures for
effectuating the new rules, they will have to decide what kind of
legal representation is to be provided to the indigent accused
during the police process. The Court in Miranda said that the decision does not mean "that each police station must have a 'station
house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners. '46 When
Escobedo was decided, it was asserted that the Court's rule was
"wholly unworkable and impossible to administer unless police
cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover agents
47
If
and police informants have defense counsel at their side."
Escobedo presented a difficult problem, Miranda goes further.
40. See Van Pelt, The Meaning and Scope of
F.R.D. 441, 451-52 (1965).
41. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490
42. 384 U.S. at 477.
43. Id. at 440. See also Brain v. United States,
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. 384 U.S. at 500.
46. Id. at 474.
47. Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478,
opinion).

Escobedo v. Illinois, 38
(1964).
168 U.S. 532, 562 (1897).

496 (1964)

(dissenting
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Should the public defender be on constant call, regardless of the
inconvenience of time, or should interrogation be delayed until
his normal office hours, thereby giving unapprehended accomplices time to make good their escape? In many jurisdictions, the
public defender handles only non-capital cases. Must interrogation of those suspected of capital offenses wait until the court appoints counsel or until private legal aid is arranged, or should the
public defender step in and provide counsel during interrogation
only? In communities that have no public defender, can there be
no interrogation whatsoever until counsel is appointed or otherwise provided? There can be no single answer to these questions
because numerous solutions will be found by the various jurisdictions.
As to costs, the system will be expensive, but not prohibitively
so, since the right to counsel has already been held to be obligatory
upon the states by Gideon v. Wainwright.48 The additional expense occasioned by Miranda will be that of providing counsel
earlier in the criminal process.
Of primary importance in Miranda is the Court's discussion of a
suspect's waiver of his rights. Certain guidelines are definitely
stated in the opinion: (1) If the state takes a confession after interrogation and without counsel present, the "heavy burden" of
proving that the defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel," rests on the state.49 (2) After the warnings are
given, the waiver must be expressed. Waiver may never be implied from the accused's silence. 50 (3) Proof of any lengthy questioning or confinement before the confession will be "strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights."'" Proof of
waiver of right to counsel will be difficult. 5' The presence of counsel will provide a witness as to whether the right to silence was
waived, 5 however, there is no witness present when the accused
waives his right to counsel.
Mr. Justice White, in his dissent, states that the rule of Miranda
is irrational in that, although the accused may answer no questions
without suitable warnings, he is permitted to answer, without the
advice of counsel, the very important question of whether he
wishes to consult with counsel.5 4 This apparent discrepancy sug48. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49. 384 U.S. at 475.
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 476.
52. See note 23, supra, and accompanying text.
53. See Note, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 221 (1964).
54. 384 U.S. at 535-36.
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gests that the next logical step after Miranda would be a right to
counsel which attaches immediately and cannot be waived except
after consulting with counsel. This would create a great burden
and could eliminate custodial interrogation entirely. 55 Justice
White, when he dissented in Escobedo, expressed the view that the
goal of the Court seemingly is "to bar from evidence all admissuspected of a crime, whether
sions obtained from an individual
'5 6
involuntarily made or not.
RETROACTMTY

One week after handing down its decision in Miranda, the

57
Court ruled in a seven to two decision in Johnson v. New Jersey

that Miranda and Escobedo should apply only to cases which commenced after those decisions were announced. Emphasizing that it
did not in any way disparage a constitutional guarantee by declining to apply it retroactively,5" the Court held that Escoebdo
affects only those cases in which the trial began after June 22,
1964 and Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial began
after June 13, 1966. 5 9 The Court pointed out that:
[R] etroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda would
seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws.
It would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity
with previously announced constitutional standards.6 0
The Court further held that Escobedo and Miranda would not
be applicable to cases still on direct appeal when these decisions
were announced. Law enforcement agencies had heretofore not
been apprised of the safeguards which are now required. The
procedures they used were not designed to intentionally deprive
the accused of his rights. The Court stated that it would "impose
an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice" to upset
all of the convictions which are still pending on direct appeal. 61
Throughout its opinion in Johnson, the Court stressed that the
non-retroactivity of Escobedo and Miranda will not preclude appeals by persons whose trials have already been completed. The
case law holding coerced confessions violative of due process is still
55. See note 16, supra.
56. 378 U.S. at 495.
57. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). For a discussion of the question of Escobedo's
retroactivity prior to this decision, see Van Pelt, The Meaning and Scope
of Escobedo v. Illinois, 38 F.R.D. 441, 460 (1965); Comment, 64 MICH. L. REV.
832 (1966).
58. 384 U.S. at 728.
59. Id. at 721.
60. 384 U.S. at 731.
61. 384 U.S. at 733.
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available to such individuals. They are in no way precluded from
invoking the voluntariness test. Such a claim presents no problem
62
of retroactivity.
CONCLUSION

In Miranda the Court has reiterated the constitutional rights of
those who are taken into police custody. In order to assure that
those rights are exercised and properly observed, the Court has
felt required to impose on the police the burden of making the
enumerated warnings. Whether the decision was necessary, appropriate or wise, are questions which will long be debated. The
more immediate problems are those of compliance with the rules
and definition of their apparent uncertainties. If it be agreed that
one taken into custody has the right to remain silent and the right
to counsel, a requirement of warning would seem to be appropriate
if not necessary to give those rights full effect. As the Court has
observed,
[N] o system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if
it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the
citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to
fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights.
If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the efthen there is
fectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
63
something very wrong with that system.
EDWARD P.

62.
63.

384 U.S. at 730, 732, 735.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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